Abstract. We investigate quantified interpreted systems, a semantics to model multi-agent systems in which agents can reason about individuals, their properties, and relationships among them. The semantics naturally extends interpreted systems to first-order by introducing a domain of individuals. We analyse a first-order epistemic language interpreted on this semantics and show soundness and completeness of the quantified modal system QS5 D n , an axiomatisation for these structures. Finally, we exemplify the use of the logic by modelling message passing systems, a typical class of interpreted systems analysed in epistemic logic.
Introduction
Modal epistemic logic has been widely studied in multi-agent systems (MAS) both on its own and in combination with other modalities, very often temporal ones. The typical language extends propositional logic by adding n modalities K i representing the knowledge of agent i, as well as other modalities representing different mental states for the agents (distributed and common knowledge, beliefs, etc) and/or the temporal flow of time [6, 17] . The use of modal propositional logic as a specification language is so routine to require little justification: it is a rather expressive language, well-understood from a theoretical point of view. Still it is hard to counterargue the remark, often raised by practitioners in Software Engineering, that quantification in specifications is so natural and convenient that it really should be brought explicitly into the language. Even when working with finite domains of individuals, without quantification one is often forced to introduce ad-hoc propositions to emulate basic relations among individuals (as to express specifications like "the child of process p can send a message to all the processes that are allowed to invoke p"). Not always quantification is simply syntactic sugar: certain expressivity needs do require infinite domains (e.g., see section 4 below). Further, epistemic modalities can be combined with quantifiers to express concepts such as knowledge de re/de dicto [8] .
D n and interpret it on quantified interpreted systems, a valued version of systems of global states. In section 4 we exemplify syntax and semantics by describing a formal model for message-passing systems and discuss some specification patterns in L D n . In section 5 we introduce the firstorder modal system Q.S5 D n , and prove the main result of this paper: Q.S5 D n is a sound and complete axiomatisation of the validities in the structures of global states. Finally, section 6 outlines some extensions of the present formalism.
Systems of Global States and Kripke Frames
In this section we introduce the systems of global states and Kripke frames in a first-order setting. While the first ones are used in computer science to model the behaviour of MAS [6, 10] , Kripke frames are best employed to get a deeper understanding of the formal properties of these systems [3, 4] . Technically, we extend the corresponding propositional structures to the first-order. This extension is entirely not trivial, as there are many ways of performing it: for instance, we have to choose between a single or several quantifying domains for each agent and/or for each computational state, not to mention domains of intensional objects [2] . In this paper we consider the simplest construction, where we have just a single quantification domain D common to all the agents and states, which contains all possible objects. We leave other options for further work. In what follows we assume a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n}.
Systems of Global States
This paper is primarily concerned with the representation of knowledge in MAS, not their temporal evolution. Given this, we adopt the "static" perspective on the systems of global states [16] , rather than the "dynamic" version [6] . So, while we assume that the states of the system result from the evolution given by protocols and transitions, for the time being we do not consider them explicitly. More formally, consider a set L i of local states l i , l i , . . ., for each agent i ∈ A, and a set L e containing the local states of the environment l e , l e , . . .. We define a system of global states as follows: This definition of SGS is based on two assumptions. First, the domain D of individuals is the same for every agent i, so that all the agents effectively reason about the same objects. This choice is justified by the external account of knowledge usually adopted in the framework of interpreted systems. If knowledge is ascribed to the agents by an external observer, it seems natural to focus on a unique set of individuals: the ones assumed to exist by the external observer. Second, the domain D is assumed to be the same for every global state, i.e., no individual appears nor disappears in moving from one state to another. This also is consistent with the external account of knowledge: all the individuals are supposed to be existing from the observer's viewpoint. We discuss further options in section 6. Finally, it can be the case that A ⊆ D. This means that the agents can reason about themselves, their properties, and relationships.
Kripke Frames
While Kripke frames are less intuitive than interpreted systems to model MAS, they are more convenient for the purpose of formal analysis, notably completeness investigations. We work with frames with equivalence relations, so we take the following definition: Definition 2. An equivalence frame F is a n + 2-tuple W, ∼ 1 , . . . , ∼ n , D such that W is a non-empty set; ∼ i is an equivalence relation on W , for every i ∈ A; D is a non-empty set of individuals. F E is the class of all the equivalence frames. Now we have systems of global states modelling MAS and equivalence frames. In order to axiomatise SGS, it is useful to map SGSs into equivalence frames.
Maps between SGS and F E
We explore the relationship between these structures by means of two maps f and g from SGS to F E and viceversa. We show that every SGS S is isomorphic to g(f (S)), that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence onto the sets of global states and the domains of individuals. Further, we prove that every equivalence frame 
As a consequence, every sound and complete axiomatisation of the equivalence frames is also an axiomatisation of the systems of global states.
We start with the map f : SGS → F E . Let S = S, D be an SGS, define f (S) as the n + 2-tuple S, ∼ 1 , . . . , ∼ n , D , where S is the set of possible states and D is the domain of individuals. Moreover, for each i ∈ A, the relation ∼ i on S such that l e , l 1 , . . . , l n ∼ i l e , l 1 , . . . , l n iff l i = l i is an equivalence relation. So f (S) is an equivalence frame.
For the converse map g :
. . , ∼ n , D be an equivalence frame. For every epistemic state w ∈ W , for every equivalence relation ∼ i , let the equivalence class [w] ∼i = {w |w ∼ i w } be the set of local states for agent i and W the set of local states for the environment. Define g(F) = S, D , where S contains all n + 1-tuples w, [w] ∼1 , . . . , [w] ∼n , for w ∈ W , while D is as above. The structure g(F) is trivially an SGS.
We prove that the composition of the two maps gives isomorphic structures.
Lemma 1. Every equivalence frame F is isomorphic to f (g(F)).
The composition f • g is a bijection between W and W : it is oneto-one as if w, w ∈ W and w = w , then in particular the first components of w and w are equal. It is onto as the first component w 1 of w ∈ W is such that w 1 ∈ W and f (g(w 1 )) = w. Also, the identity on D is a bijection. Moreover,
Thus, the two structures are isomorphic.
By Lemma 1 we will show in section 5 that a sound and complete axiomatisation of equivalence frames is adequate also with respect to SGSs.
Syntax and Semantics
In this section we introduce the first-order multi-modal language L D n containing individual variables and constants, as well as quantifiers, n epistemic operators, the distributed knowledge operator, and the identity. The language L D n is interpreted on models based on equivalence frames. Finally, we present the quantified interpreted systems, a valued version of the systems of global states.
Syntax
Our first-order multi-modal formulas are defined on an alphabet containing individual variables x 1 , x 2 , . . ., n-ary functors f n 1 , f n 2 , . . . and n-ary predicative letters P n 1 , P n 2 , . . ., for n ∈ N, the identity =, the propositional connectives ¬ and →, the universal quantifier ∀, the epistemic operators K i , for i ∈ A, and the distributed knowledge operator D G , for G ⊆ A. Terms and formulas in the language L D n are defined as follows:
The symbols ⊥, ∧, ∨, ↔ and ∃ are defined by means of the other logical constants; we refer to the 0-ary functors as individual constants c 1 , c 2 , . . . A closed term v is a term where no variable appears, the closed terms are only constants and terms obtained by applying functors to closed terms. By t[ y] (resp. φ[ y]) we mean that y = y 1 , . . . , y n are all the free variables in t (resp. φ); while t[ y/ t] (resp. φ[ y/ t]) denotes the term (resp. formula) obtained by simultaneously substituting some, possibly all, free occurrences of y in t (resp. φ) with t = t 1 , . . . , t n , renaming bounded variables if necessary.
Semantics
In order to assign a meaning to the formulas in L D n we make use of Kripke models. We define validity on quantified interpreted systems in terms of validity on Kripke models.
Definition 3 (model).
A Kripke model M -or simply a model -based on an equivalence frame F, is a couple F, I where I is an interpretation such that:
k is a k-ary predicative letter and w ∈ W , then I(P k , w) is a k-ary relation on D, i.e. I(P k , w) ⊆ D k ; -the interpretation I(=, w) of the identity = in w is the equality on D.
Note that function symbols are interpreted rigidly, that is, for every w, w ∈ W the interpretation of a functor f k in w is the same as the interpretation of f k in w . Given that our approach is the one of the external observer, rigid designators seem appropriate.
Let σ be an assignment, i.e., any function from the set of variables in L D n to the domain D, the valuation I σ (t) of a term t is defined as follows:
In particular, the valuation
The variant σ x a of the assignment σ differs from σ at most on x and assigns element a ∈ D to x. Now we define the truth conditions for the formulas in L D n .
Definition 4 (Satisfaction).
The satisfaction relation |= for a formula φ ∈ L D n , a world w ∈ M and an assignment σ is inductively defined as follows:
, w) |= ψ The truth conditions for the formulas containing the symbols ⊥ ∧, ∨, ↔ and ∃ are standardly defined from the ones above. Further, a formula φ in L D n is said to be true at a world w if it is satisfied at w by every assignment σ; valid on a model M if it is true at every world in M; valid on a frame F if it is valid on every model on F; valid on a class C of frames if it is valid on every frame in C.
Let ∆ be a set of formulas in L D n , we say that M is a model for ∆ if every formula in ∆ is valid on M. Moreover, F is a frame for ∆ if every model based on F is a model for ∆.
Now we have all the preliminary definitions to introduce the quantified interpreted systems (QIS).
Definition 5 (QIS). A quantified interpreted systems
The notions of satisfaction, truth and validity are defined as above, i.e., let P f = f (S), I be the Kripke model for the quantified interpreted system P = S, I ,
n is valid on a quantified interpreted systems P if φ is valid on P f , or more formally: Definition 6 (Validity on QIS). If φ is a formula in L D n and P is a quantified interpreted systems, then P |= φ if P f |= φ.
Thus, we can reason about a multi-agent system by using the expressiveness of QISs, but rely on Kripke models to prove properties of the system. By the definition of validity on QISs, if φ ∈ L D n is a validity on the class F E of equivalence frames, then φ holds on the class of SGSs.
Some Validities
We briefly explore the semantics of QISs by considering the traditional Barcan formulas [8] . Given that the domain of quantification is the same for every global state, both the Barcan formula and its converse are valid on the class QIS of all QISs, i.e., they hold in every quantified interpreted system (for a proof see the reference above):
These validities are in line with the bird's eye approach usually adopted in epistemic logic. By BF i if agent i knows that a is φ for each individual a, then she knows that all the individuals are φ, even if she has not to be aware of this fact. In other words, agents are assumed to be able to generalise their knowledge, at least when this is considered from an external point of view. By CBF i if agent i knows that all the individuals are φ, then she knows that a is φ, for each individual a ∈ D. Similar considerations apply to BF G and CBF G . Once again we underline that the external account of knowledge applies both to de re and de dicto modalities, i.e., whether the quantifier is outside or inside the scope of a knowledge operator. We have also generalised versions of the Barcan formula and its converse, for arbitrary strings of epistemic operators:
where each E j k is either K i or D G . Even if these principles seem quite strong, by considering an external notion of knowledge they do not appear problematic either. They say that agents can generalise and particularise not only their direct knowledge, but also the knowledge they have of other agents' knowledge, when this is considered from the viewpoint of an external observer.
Message-Passing QIS
In this section we show how to model a message-passing system (MPS) in the framework of QISs. An MPS is a multi-agent system where the most relevant actions are sending and receiving messages. In an MPS the local state of an agent i contains information about its initial state, the messages it has sent and received, and the internal actions it has taken. For the formal presentation of message-passing systems we refer to [6] , par. 4.4.5-6, although here we do not explicitly consider the temporal evolution of MPSs. The main result of this section consists in showing that Proposition 4.4.3 in [6] can be reformulated as a validity on the class of QISs modelling MPSs. More formally, for every agent i ∈ A we introduce an initial event init(i), a set IN T i of internal actions α 1 , α 2 , . . ., and a set M SG of messages µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . A local state l i for agent i is a sequence of events whose first element is init(i) and whose following elements are events of the form send(i, j, µ), rec(i, j, µ) or int(i, α), for j ∈ A, µ ∈ M SG and α ∈ IN T i , describing the actions performed by i. Intuitively, send(i, j, µ) represents the event agent i sends message µ to j, while rec(i, j, µ) represents the event agent i receives message µ from j, and int(i, α) represents the event agent i performs internal action α.
A global state s is an n-tuple l e , l 1 , . . . , l n , where l e contains all the events in l 1 , . . . , l n . We now define a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation ≤ on the local states of agent i such that l i ≤ l i iff l i is a prefix of l i . This order extends to global states, so that s ≤ s iff l i ≤ l i , for every i ∈ A. The message-passing QISs (MPQISs) init(1), . . . , init(n) . These constraints correspond to the assumption that every MPQIS models the evolution of a single MPS: starting from the initial state, the MPQIS contains all the states reachable during the execution of the MPS. The temporal evolution of an MPS can be represented as a sequence s 0 , s 1 , . . . of global states such that s 0 = init(e), init(1), . . . , init(n) , and for every n ∈ N, either s n+1 is identical to s n or there is an i such that l i (s n ) ≤ l i (s n+1 ) but l i (s n ) = l i (s n+1 ). Note that a single MPQIS represents various temporal evolutions differing on the number of idle steps. Finally, in each MPQIS the domain D of individuals comprises all agents in A, the messages in M SG, the actions in the various IN T i , and the events e 1 , e 2 , . . .
We assume that the language L D n has terms and predicative letters for representing the objects in the domain D and the relations among them. In particular, e 1 , e 2 , . . . are metaterms ranging over events: we write ∀eφ[e] as a shorthand for
. We use the same notation for the objects in the model and the syntactic elements, as the ones mirror the others; the distinction will be made clear by the context. We immediately give some examples of the expressiveness of our language. In L D n we can define events by formulas which are provably valid in every MPQIS (the existence of a unique individual ∃! can be defined by means of =):
The first formula expresses the fact that every event is either a send or receive event, where the sender is different from the receiver, or an initial event, or an internal action. Thus, it cannot be the case that e = send(i, j, µ) = send(i , j , µ ), for distinct agents and messages. The second formula says that every send or receive event, initial event, and internal action are distinct events. Thus, we cannot have send(i, j, µ) = e = rec(i , j , µ ). It is easy to check that our MPQISs validates these specifications.
It is more interesting to consider specifications involving epistemic operators. In [6] , p. 132, the authors list three constraints on MPSs, the third one involves runs in an SGS. Nonetheless, we can reformulate the first two without introducing runs:
MP1 every l i (s) contains only events over init(i), IN T i and M SG; MP2 for every event rec(i, j, µ) in l i (s) there exists a corresponding event send(j, i, µ) in l j (s).
We formalise these specifications in the language of MPQISs. First, we introduce a predicative constant H for 'happened' such that (P σ , s) |= H(e) iff e is an event in s. The formulas Send(i, j, µ), Rec(i, j, µ), Init(i), and Int(i, α) are shorthands for H(send(i, j, µ)), H(rec(i, j, µ)), H(init(i)), and H(int(i, α)) respectively. Now we formalise our specification as follows:
If e ∈ l i (s) then (P σ , s) |= K i H(e). By MP1' (P σ , s) |= e = init(i) ∨ ∃α, j, µ(e = int(i, α) ∨ e = send(i, j, µ) ∨ e = rec(i, j, µ)), which means that if event e belongs to the local state of agent i, then it is either i's initial event, or it is an internal action of i, or it is a send or receive event of i, that is, MP1 holds. Further, if event rec(i, j, µ) appears in l i (s), then by MP2' (P σ , s) |= K i Send(j, i, µ), which means that in particular send(j, i, µ) ∈ l j (s), that is, MP2 holds.
It is easy to check that MP1' holds in the class of all MPQISs by the way they are defined, while MP2' in general can fail. Moreover, in [6] the authors single out the reliable MPSs, where every message sent is eventually received. Modified from [6] , an MPS is reliable iff it satisfies the specification below:
MP4 for all agents i, j and all states s, if send(i, j, µ) is in l i (s), then there exists a s such that rec(j, i, µ) is in l j (s ).
We formalise this specification as follows:
In fact, if send(i, j, µ) is in l i (s), by MP4' (P σ , s) |= ¬K i ¬Rec(j, i, µ), this means that there exists a global state s such that (P σ , s ) |= Rec(j, i, µ), that is, rec(j, i, µ) ∈ l j (s ). Thus, MP4 holds. Note that MP4' is far stronger than MP4 as the former requires that the local states of agent i in s and s are identical.
We now prove the main result of this section, that is, Proposition 4.4.3 in [6] can be restated as a validity on the class of MPQISs satisfying MP1, MP2 and two simplifying assumptions. As to the former, in presenting the MPSs in [6] , the authors model the local state of an agent as a sequence of sets of events. Then they introduce the semplifying assumption MP5, according to which the sets of events are actually singletons. Since we defined the local states as tuples of events, MP5 is already satisfied in the present framework. As regards the latter assumption:
MP6 All the events in a given agent's local state are distinct.
Also for MP6 we can find a formula in L D n whose validity guarantees that this specification holds. We say that (P σ , s) |= P rec(e, e ) iff (P σ , s) |= H(e) ∧ H(e ) and for every s ≤ s, (P σ , s ) |= H(e ) → H(e). Intuitively, P rec(e, e ) means that event e appears no later than e ; while Succ(e, e ) stands for that event e happens immediately after event e.
MP6' ∀e, e (e = e ∧K i H(e)∧K i H(e ) → K i (¬Succ(e, e)∧¬(P rec(e, e )∧P rec(e , e)))
If it is not the case that MP6, then we have two occurrences of event e in l i (s). If these are not separated by any event e , then Succ(e, e) holds and we have a contradiction. If they are separated by some other event e , then (P σ , s) |= P rec(e, e ) ∧ P rec(e , e), that is, MP6' fails.
Henceforth we consider only MPQISs satisfying the specifications above, except MP4. We define a notion of potential causality between events, which is intended to capture the intuition that event e might have caused event e . Fix a subset G of A, the relation → holds between events e, e iff:
1. for i, j ∈ G, e is a receive event and e is the corresponding send event; 2. for some agent i ∈ G, events e, e are both in l i (s) for some global state s and either e = e or e comes earlier than e in l i (s); 3. for some event e we have e → e and e → e .
Note that → is anti-symmetric because of MP6. We say that (P σ , s) |= e → e if e → e (we use the same notation for semantic and syntactic elements). Now we prove that the potential causality relation → respects the order P rec of events by showing that the following validity holds in the class of MPQISs satisfying the specifications above. Note that this is the right to left implication of Proposition 4.4.3 in [6] :
Proof. Assume that (P σ , s) |= H(e) ∧ H(e ) ∧ e → e . If e is a receive event rec(i, j, µ) and e is the corresponding send event send(j, i, µ), then (s, s ) ∈ i∈G ∼ i implies (P σ , s ) |= H(e) ∧ H(e ) and for s ≤ s , (P σ , s ) |= H(e ) → H(e) by MP2'. Thus, (P σ , s) |= D G P rec(e, e ). If e, e are both in l i (s) and either e = e or e comes earlier than e in l i (s),
. Also in this case (P σ , s) |= D G P rec(e, e ). Finally, if there exists some event e such that e → e and e → e , then (P σ , s) |= H(e ) → D G P rec(e, e ), H(e ) → D G P rec(e , e ). Without loss of generality we can assume that e → e for either case 1 or 2 above, in both cases (P σ , s) |= H(e ). Therefore, for every s , (s, s ) ∈ i∈G ∼ i implies (P σ , s ) |= H(e) ∧ H(e ) and for s ≤ s , (P σ , s ) |= H(e ) → H(e) ∧ H(e ) → H(e ). By transitivity (P σ , s ) |= H(e ) → H(e). Thus, (P σ , s) |= D G P rec(e, e ).
The example of the message-passing systems analysed in this section clearly shows the advantages of first-order modal languages in comparison with propositional ones. We were able to formalize in L D n various constraints on MPSs. Most important, Proposition 4.4.3 in [6] turned out out be a validity on the class of QISs modelling MPSs.
Axiomatisation
In this section we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of the validities on the systems of global states. Note that while it is customary in modal logic to axiomatise unvalued structures (hence our choice of SGS), the same result applies to QIS. Technically, we first prove the completeness of the firstorder multi-modal system Q.S5 In [14] Kripke proved the completeness of monomodal Q.S5 without distributed knowledge (see also [8, 13] ). The novelty of this section consists in showing that the techniques in [7] for propositional S5 D n can be rather straightforwardly extended to the first-order for proving the completeness of Q.S5 D n .
System Q.S5

D n
The system Q.S5 D n on the language L D n is a first-order multi-modal version of the propositional system S5. Hereafter we list its postulates; note that ⇒ is the inference relation between formulas. Taut every classic propositional tautology
We take the standard definitions of proof and theorem: φ stands for formula
It is easy to check that every equivalence frame F is a frame for Q.S5 In the next paragraph we show that the axioms in Q.S5 D n are not only necessary, but also sufficient to prove all the validities on SGS. In conclusion we show that the converse of the Barcan formula is provable in Q.S5 D n . For a proof of BF , we refer to [8] p.138.
Completeness
We prove the completeness of Q.S5 D n by extending to the first-order the proof for the propositional system S5 D n in [7] . Specifically, we show that if Q.S5 To show the first part of the result we rely on two lemmas: the saturation lemma and the truth lemma. In order to state these partial results we need the following definitions: let Λ be a set of formulas in The following result follows from Henkin's and Lindenbaum's lemmas, a proof can be found in [13] . -for i ∈ A, R i is the relation on W such that wR i w iff {φ|K i φ ∈ w} ⊆ w ; -for G ⊆ A, R G is the relation on W such that wR G w iff {φ|D G φ ∈ w} ⊆ w ; -D is the set of equivalence classes
Proof. Also this proof is by induction on the length of φ. If φ is an atomic formula, then the coimplication follows because I = I * . The cases for the propositional connectives are straightforward.
For φ = K i ψ or φ = D G ψ, the inductive step goes as in the propositional case; we refer to [7] for a detailed proof.
, then the canonical model M pseudo-satisfies ¬φ by Lemma 4. By Lemma 5 also M * pseudo-satisfies ¬φ, and by the last result above M does not validate φ. Thus, we state the following completeness result.
Theorem 1 (Completeness). The system Q.S5
D n is complete with respect to the class F E of equivalence frames.
As a consequence, we have completeness also with respect to the systems of global states. In fact, if φ then by Theorem 1 there exists a model M = F, I based on an equivalence frame F, which falsifies φ. In order to prove that SGS |= φ we have to find a quantified interpreted system P falsifying φ. Define P as g(F), I : by the definition of validity in QISs, P |= φ iff P f = f (g(F)), I models φ, but by Lemma 1 f (g(F)) is isomorphic to F. Hence P |= φ.
As a result, we have the following implications and a further completeness result:
SGS |= φ, then F E |= φ, then Q.S5 
Conclusions
As we argued in the Introduction, first-order modal formalisms offer expressivity advantages over propositional modal ones. But the cited explorations already carried out on this subject in MAS and, more in general, in knowledge representation and Artificial Intelligence, have so far fallen short of a deep and systematic analysis of the machinery even in the case of static epistemic logic.
In this paper we believe we have made a first attempt in this direction: the axiomatisation presented, even if limited to the static case, shows that the popular system S5 D n extends naturally to first-order. In carrying out this exercise we tried to remain as close as possible to the original semantics of interpreted systems, so that fine grained specifications of MAS may be expressed, as recent work on model checking interpreted systems demonstrates [9, 18] .
Different extensions of the present framework seem worth pursuing. First of all, it seems interesting to relax the assumption on the domain of quantification and admit a different domain d(w) for every state w. Further, we could assume a different domain of quantification d a (w) for each agent a in a state w. In this case quantification would be agent-indexed, i.e. we would be using a different quantifier ∀ a for every agent a ∈ A. In such an extended framework we should check whether the validities on MPQISs in section 4 still hold, and how to modify the completeness proof for Q.S5 D n . Also, it would be of interest to explore the completeness issues resulting from term-indexing epistemic operators as in [15] .
In an orthogonal dimension to the above, another significant extension would be to add temporal operators to the formalism. This would open the way for an exploration of axiomatisations for temporal/epistemic logic for MAS. While as reported in the Introduction we are not so concerned with the satisfiability problem, in doing so attention will have to be paid to the results in [11] .
